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The global scourge of terrorism has been arguably the most pressing issue on the
agenda of the international community in the 21st century. Britain has been inextricably
linked with many of the key developments, from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the
7/7 bombings and debates over detention orders and the use of torture in interrogations.
In this blog post, Professor Richard English draws on some of the earlier experiences
of Britain facing a problem of political violence in Northern Ireland and suggests certain
principles that should inform appropriate counter-terrorism policy.
There are no easy lessons to draw from the Northern Ireland conflict. Nor should it be
thought that, just because things happened in one way in Northern Ireland, they will
necessarily follow suit in conflicts elsewhere. But there are aspects of what happened in the Northern Ireland
conflict which might share sufficient family resemblances with experience in other settings, to allow us to
suggest some elements of responses to terrorism which are wiser than others.
Here, I’ll mention seven.
First, terrorism is unlikely to be utterly eradicated, even if peace processes go well. Terrorist violence in
Northern Ireland long pre-dated the onset of the 1960s Troubles, and it has remained extant, at much lower
levels, in the period since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.  Learning to live with some violence, and
containing rather than eradicating it altogether, seem appropriate responses.
Second, we should avoid an over-militarization of the response to terrorism. Ex-IRA members whom I have
interviewed again and again stressed that the British Army’s heavy-handedness in the early 1970s in
Northern Ireland made recruitment to the Provisional IRA much easier, and IRA popularity much greater.  It is
not that there is no role for military elements in a response; but those elements should be restrained as far
as possible.
Third, high-grade intelligence, and the proper analysis of such data, should embody the primary mechanism
for containing terrorist groups. By the end of the Northern Ireland Troubles, the police and security service
were far more adept at penetrating terrorist organizations than had been the case at the onset of the
conflict, and the levels of violence were lowered as a consequence.
Fourth, where possible address the root causes of the violence. This is not to say that states should give
terrorist groups what they want. It is to say that there are occasions – as in Northern Ireland during the
1990s – when you can give enough to satisfy most of a terrorist group’s constituency, short of what the
terrorists themselves ostensibly wanted; and that you can reduce violence as a result.
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Fifth, respect orthodox legal frameworks and
adhere to the democratically established rule of
law. It is tempting to abandon legal restraint in the
face of appalling terrorist violence. But such
transgressions more commonly work to terrorists’
advantage than to the state’s, as was true in
Northern Ireland and has been true post-9/11 in
the wider international setting.
Sixth, maintain strong credibility in public
response to terrorism and in public argument
about it.  Repeated efforts by the UK government
to present terrorism in Northern Ireland as less
political, and more purely criminal, than it was, did
little to help the state defeat terrorism. And there is no need to misrepresent terrorist motivation or politics:
the state’s arguments and diagnoses will often enough be sufficiently strong to win the argument if made
honestly, credibly and patiently.
Seventh, ensure coordination of all counter-terrorist efforts across different wings of the state, and between
different states cooperating in fighting the same opponent.  Relations between various UK police forces, the
army, and MI5 were, by the end of the Troubles, much better than they had been earlier on. And relations
between the UK and the Republic of Ireland were crucial in helping to contain terrorist violence.
This does not provide a neat template to be applied everywhere that political violence emerges. It does
attempt to draw on Northern Irish experience as it resonates with experience in many other conflict zones and
to provide a basis for some fruitful reflection, debate and (dis)agreement.
This post was based upon a talk given at the LSE on Monday 23rd May 2011 as part of a discussion on The
Lessons of Northern Ireland for Contemporary Counterterrorism and Conflict Resolution Policy. Follow the
hyperlink to access a podcast of the event.
